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Truth and Self at Colonus
GRACE LEDBETTER
Two questions about Sophocles’s most mysterious surviving play, 
Oedipus at Colonus, loom large both in the critical literature and, 
one can easily imagine, for readers more generally. The first asks 
whether in this play Oedipus, the polluted, banished, suffering em­
bodiment of unspeakable horror, ends truly transformed into a di­
vine savior and healer. The answer eludes us because, while Oedipus’s 
recognized prophetic powers and his apparent apotheosis promise 
to imbue Athens with future benefit, the lasting trauma of his life 
asserts itself repeatedly throughout the play and, along with his 
steely curse that will bring violent death to his own sons, suggests 
that perhaps Oedipus has not been entirely transfigured, that he per­
haps continues to play his accursed role in the house ofLabdacus. As 
Martha Reineke puts it, “Substantive change cannot be tracked from 
Oedipus the King to Oedipus at Colonus. Oedipus’ story remains sub­
ject to a double telling; the face of the polluting monster and blind 
savior are one.”^ 'The second question resonates with an experience
1. Reineke (2014, 129). Reneike (126-29), presents a dear and compelling account of the 
scholarly work on both sides of this debate.
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that many have had reading the play: What actually happens in this 
long play other than the miracle of Oedipus’s death? Read in one way, 
the play consists of digressions and delaying tactics (Will Theseus re­
ceive Oedipus into Athens? Will Antigone and Ismene be captured? 
Will Creon and Polynices persuade Oedipus to return to Thebes?), 
which, although they pose no deeply tragic threats or tensions, enter­
tain the audience reasonably well until the “winged thunder of Zeus” 
(1460) marks the commencement of the real action.^
In this chapter I address both of these questions with an inter­
pretation that at once locates one of the play’s fundamental concerns 
and accounts for why the polarity of savior/polluted monster resists 
resolution. I argue that the business of this play finds Oedipus de­
fining and distinguishing multiple images of reality, or “truths,” in 
an effort to meet the challenges to his conception of himself posed 
by his traumatic past. Oedipus works to define and ultimately 
succeeds in defining himself as a complex and differentiated subject 
who withstands difficult tensions, and in doing so reaches a state 
of psychic health. All in all, the figure and characteristic activity 
of Oedipus while he is in Colonus can be said to articulate a ther­
apeutic process that centers on his establishing a complex but or­
dered picture of his various images of truth and reality. I argue that 
a recent psychoanalytic theory of the self, when used as a heuristic 
device, illuminates and helps to resolve some of the play ’s most in­
tractable problems of interpretation, as it reveals a unified purpose 
connecting nearly every scene. The ideas about psychic health that 
I discuss, even though they derive from a contemporary psychoan­
alytic theory, engage (in a different way) many of the philosophical 
issues that, for example, Plato addresses in his notion of a healthy
2. See, for example, Waldock (1951, 219) on “filler” scenes in the play. Except when noted 
otherwise, all translations are firom Lloyd-Jones (1994) and refer to the line numbers of the 
Greek text.
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soul that has distinct parts that function together without conflict 
and as a harmonious whole.^
In her recent psychoanalytic and philosophical study, Truth 
Matters: Theory and Practice in Psychoanalysis, Shlomit Yadlin-Gadot 
defends a theory of truth that takes into account both the history of 
philosophical notions of truth and the role that ideas of truth play in 
psychoanalytic theory and practice."^ Yadlin-Gadot’s theory proposes 
that different theories of truth in the history of philosophy (for ex­
ample, truth as correspondence, truth as coherence, truth as subjec­
tively constructed) each hold a kind of validity that accommodates 
different basic psychic needs. Her thesis thus maintains that truth is 
multiple and, among other things, “an inherent group of distinct and 
definable organizing principles of the psyche.”^ By defining six “truth 
axes,” which function as epistemic assumptions, characteristic self­
states, and images of reality, Yadlin-Gadot lays the groundwork for 
a view of therapy that aims to express and clarify the different selves 
and their well-defined boundaries and open up a space for them to 
exist together and become more familiar to each other. As Yadlin- 
Gadot puts it, “The overarching need for truth is expressed across sev­
eral dimensions of the subject’s life. Each truth axis creates an image 
of reality and a truth within it that ensures the provision of a deep 
emotional need which motivated the formation.”® Seen in this way, 
the self “gradually evolves from this organization, acquiring progres­
sively its unity, continuity and coherence.”^ If the word “axis” gives us 
trouble, it may be helpful to think of the truth axes as sets of beliefs
3. See especially Republic 4.443b8-44Se4. For example, “Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a 
kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be a disease, ugli­
ness, and weakness” (444dl0-e2).
4. Yadlin-Gadot (2016).
5. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,1).
6. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,125).
7. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,272).
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(held with certainty) regarding a particular dimension of one’s life. 
The theory requires us to accept a number of claims about truth: that 
it is not one and absolute, that it is “inextricably tied up with the sub­
ject and determined by his needs” that it is “a dynamic product of a 
long and gradual process of ordering ” that “different notions of truth 
do not invalidate each other” and that we have a basic desire for truth 
that is resilient even in the face of postmodern critiques.®
Each of the six truth axes creates its own image of reality—its own 
point of certainty—with regard to a particular psychic need. (1) The 
need to manage factual reality and negotiate the mind-independent 
reality around us constructs a “factual reality” and finds its philo­
sophical correlate in correspondence theories of truth, which Yadlin- 
Gadot identifies with Russell, Moore, and early Wittgenstein. One’s 
image of factual reality characterizes the way one views oneself in the 
third person, the way one perceives others as (accurately) perceiving 
oneself. (2) The need to lend internal coherence to perceptions of 
self and world is met by an image of “coherent truth,” a truth about 
both personal identity and perceived externality whose elements are 
checked for truth value by inner consistency. Yadlin-Gadot discusses 
Spinoza’s and Hegel’s early versions of coherence theory, but could 
just as easily have broadened the discussion to include idealist, re­
alist, and antirealist versions.’ (3) An image of reality as shared by the 
self and select others, along with a point of certainty about that reality, 
fulfills oiur need to construct a shared interpersonal truth. This inter- 
subjective self is always set against a singular or plural other, which 
can be experienced as either a comfortable “we” or a threatening 
them. Anxieties of ahenation and lack of belonging, or conversely, 
feelings of being supported by social agreement, motivate this par­
ticular need. In the history of philosophy, William James, Husserl,
8. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,64).
9. See Walker (1989).
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Dewey, and Rorty can be said to defend a version of truth as intersub- 
j ective, or reality as a set of intersubj ective practices. (4) What Yadlin- 
Gadot calls the “subjective-existential” axis of truth finds articulation 
in what some scholars have urged us to see as the existential theory 
of truth developed by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Marcel.
In Kierkegaards version, truth is a subjective moment, a movement 
from false to true that articulates an individual, authentic sense of 
truth, free from the gaze of the other: “Each subject must find both 
personal truth and integrity and an individual way to achieve it.”“ At 
the basis of this subjective-existential truth is the need to maintain 
loyalty to one’s authenticity and to counteract experiences of shame 
and fears of aimihilation. (5) Ihe need to promote goals calls for a 
“pragmatic reality,” one in which we can see ourselves as working to­
ward a future interest and calculate the ways that reality would ben­
efit the self in the future. One place to view this mode of thinking 
philosophically is in the theories of both William James and Peirce, 
which view the truth as what the future proves to be true. (6) The 
final truth axis, the ideal, constructs a reality that contains features we 
aspire to and believe in, features that we value as ideals. The Platonic 
theory of forms stands as one influential representative of this kind of 
theory of truth.^^
According to Yadlin-Gadot, these six truth “axes” (and we can al­
ternatively think of them as sets of beliefs regarding a particular di­
mension of hfe) must be recognized, defined, and separated by the 
subject in order to reach a state of psychic health. The therapeutic 
goal beyond that point consists in seeking to achieve a dialogue 
among the various axes, amehorate conflict among them, and become
10. See Cannon (1996).
11. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,55).
12. For Yadlin-Gadot s discussion of the history of philosophical notions of truth, see 39-55. 
For her basic definitions of the six axes, see 1-13.
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familiar with what are, as it were, the different “languages” spoken by 
these different aspects of the self. The subject must aspire to become 
equally familiar with all languages of the self An example might help 
us to get a better idea of how the different truth axes function in this 
theory of the self:
Imagine a familiar situation of a parent and his child returning 
from a PTA meeting in which problematic things have been 
■ said about the child. The parent s mind is probably racing with 
questions: Who, truly, is this child of mine? Who is my child as 
he is perceived by his teachers? Who is my child as he perceives 
himself to be? Also, who is the “objectively perceived” child 
described in the assessment done last year at that top notch in­
stitute? Or: What should I do with this child? Do the images 
of these different children converge into one figure? And in a 
paraphrase: Will the “true” child please step forward? Had the 
“true” child stepped forward, regardless of being disappointing 
or pleasing to the parent, the latter would have experienced the 
relief of clarity and comprehension. The price of this relief would 
have been the loss of the complexity and multi-dimensionality of 
his understanding of the child.'^
In the theory I am considering, there is no single “true” descrip­
tion of who the child is, nor are there an unlimited number of true 
descriptions of who the child is. The child’s self, and all of our selves, 
are composed of six distinct images of reality: how I view myself “fac­
tually,” or as viewed by others; my view of myself as sharing a reality 
with certain other people; my view of myself as coherent and con­
sistent; my view of my “authentic” self (who I really am to me); my 
view of myself as working and acting toward particular goals; and
13. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,144).
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my view of myself as aspiring toward certain ideals (which could be 
moral ideals, ideals oflove, ideals of career, etc.).
My purpose is not to defend or to raise objections to Yadlin- 
Gadot s theory; I do not wish here to question, for example, whether 
indeed we should be talking about “truth” rather than “belief,” or 
whether Yadlin-Gadot s particular six axes are correct or exhaustive. 
I wish still less to evaluate her account of theories of truth in the his­
tory of philosophy. I wish only to show how her theory, as it stands, 
can be used as a heuristic device to shed light on Sophocles’s play, in 
particular how it can help to sketch a picture of the dying Oedipus 
as a man working ta (re) construct the six images of reaUty as Yadlin- 
Gadot defines them in an attempt to compose a unified and healthy 
self—before he dies.
FACTUAL REALITY
We know that Oedipus has come to Colonus to die, but who ex­
actly is Oedipus at this point in his life? His early identity as a wise, 
worshipped king who grieves for the suffering of his city has been 
shattered by the successive traumas of recognition, pollution, self- 
inflicted violence, exile, and poverty. At the end of Oedipus the King 
Oedipus’s view of himself has crystallized into a single dominating 
identity: in his own view he is “utterly lost” (meg' olethrion, 1341); 
“most accursed” (kataratotaton, 1345); “the one among mortals 
most hated by the gods” (1345-46,1519); “abandoned by the gods” 
(atheos, 1360); his lot is “an evil even beyond evil” {presbuteron eti 
kakou kakon, 1365); he is the “worst” (kakiston, 1433). Oedipus’s 
view of his utter wretchedness, together with what he sees as the sin­
gularity of his abject state (he is the “one” most hated by the gods, 
the “worst”), signal a rather extreme version of what Yadlin-Gadot’s 
theory considers the hallmark of an unhealthy psyche: a “monologic”
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or “epic” state wherein the language of one of the truth axes dominates, 
“thus creating authoritarian discourse.”!"* In this case, it is the factual 
axis, how Oedipus views himself as perceived by others (“most hated 
by the gods ), that eclipses all other possible ways of defining himself, 
for example, how he might have previously seen himself as aspiring to 
certain ideals. Oedipus’s state at the end of Oedipus the King reaches 
an extreme of trauma where even the possibility of giving content to 
the other truth axes what goals he is working toward, the ideals he 
aspires to, the interpersonal world he shares with others, a coherent 
view of himself—all appear to have been obliterated.
Near the beginning of Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus fully 
acknowledges a sense of loss of his former self: his fame and fine rep­
utation have “flow[ed] away in vain” (258-59). But time has passed 
and Oedipus has received an oracle firom Apollo that has guided him 
to Colonus, promised an end to his suffering and that he would be­
come a blessing to those who accept him as a suppliant, and a curse 
to those who have cast him out (91-94). What I would like to suggest 
is that, throughout the course of this play, Oedipus goes through 
a process of articulating and thereby reconstructing the various 
components that make up his self
The axis of factual truth consists not of the way others view 
Oedipus but rather of the ways that Oedipus accepts that he is viewed 
truly by others in other words, what he takes as factually true about 
himself when he views himself objectified as a third person or as 
viewed by another. The difficulty with which Oedipus, while he is in 
Colonus, accepts the most brutal facts about himself emerges as pal­
pably as his intermittent construal of himself as a third person. When 
the chorus asks him who he is, he blurts out, “Do not, do not ask 
me who I am! Do not question me enquiring further!” (210-11). 
The same alarm seizes him suddenly much later in the play when he
14. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,269).
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has momentarily forgotten that he is polluted: “Yet what am I saying? 
How could I, who was born to misery, wish you to touch a man in 
whom every taint of evil dwells? I cannot wish it, neither can I allow 
you to do it! Only those mortals who have experienced these things 
can share the misery!” (1132-36). Oedipus accepts that he is viewed 
this way by others, and he makes that clear in his third-person formu­
lation to the chorus: “Do you know the son of Laius... and the race 
of the Labdacids ... the unhappy Oedipus?” (220-22). As we shall 
see, however, Oedipus defines precisely what he does and does not 
accept about this view of him as a polluted monster. He will accept 
as fact that he is polluted, wretched, and repulsive. However, he will 
not accept the claim that he is guilty. We will return to this point later.
Alongside his factual view of himself as polluted and wretched, 
Oedipus makes it every bit as prominent that his image of factual re­
ality includes a facet of equal salience and certainty: that he is a father. 
He does not, however, merely assert this fact; he defines it in such 
a way that he officially withdraws his fatherhood from his sons and 
embraces it as an articulated notion of mutual love and filial piety that 
he shares with his daughters. Throughout the play, Oedipus scorns 
and rejects his sons for not taking care of their suffering father, while 
he praises his daughters for caring dutifully for their father and for 
sacrificing much in order to do that (see, for example, 337-56,421- 
60, 599-601, 1348-96). The play brings to the fore Oedipus’s iden­
tity as a father, as it deals so frequently with his relationship to his 
children and dwells with great poignancy on both his cursing his sons 
and the mutual love between himself and his daughters. Oedipus 
refers to himself as a father more than once in the third person. Of 
Antigone he remarks, “The unhappy one gives second place to her 
home comforts, if her father can be cared for” (351 -52; see also 442, 
1104-5). Near the end of the play, in a culmination of the contempt 
he has expressed for his sons, he officially disowns Polynices: “Be off, 
spat upon by me who am no longer your father, villain of villains.
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taking with you these curses which I call down upon you” (1383- 
85). The counterpart to this rejection comes near his final moments 
with his daughters: “From none did you have love more than firom 
this man, without whom you will now spend the remainder of your 
lives” (1617-19).
One final component plays a significant role in Oedipus’s notion 
of factual reality about himself in the play. Oedipus asserts with 
certainty that the gods consider him a future blessing to Athens 
and a vengeful curse to his sons and Thebes (287-88, 576-78, 
787-90). Oedipus has received this knowledge through Apollo’s 
oracle, and ’Theseus honors Oedipus’s claims. Oedipus thus sees 
himself as recognized by the gods (and Theseus) as wielding a spe­
cial power, as deinos (141), in such a way that will affect mostly 
the future, although his mounting confidence and the mystifying 
circumstances of his death at the end of the play begin to demon­
strate this power.
Although it causes him considerable suffering, Oedipus manages 
to tolerate the fact that he is polluted and monstrous. Rather than 
deny this fact about himself, he holds it in the balance and offsets it by 
asserting, defining, and emphasizing his view of himself as a father, as 
well as his divinely acknowledged power as both a future blessing for 
Athens and a curse for Thebes. Oedipus’s ability to tolerate the less 
pleasant facts about himself becomes possible as he works in this play 
to introduce and articulate the countervailing facts of his redefined 
fatherhood and his newfound divine power.
COHERENT REALITY
What Oedipus clearly cannot live with as a fact about himself is 
the supposition that he is guilty and to blame for the murder of his
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father and for committing incest with his mother. He denies that he 
is guilty, and he defends his position vehemently (974-1002). We 
can understand that, for him, several inconsistencies prevent him 
from including these ostensible facts in his own notion of what is 
true about himself. He cannot be guilty of murdering his father and 
at the same time demand filial piety of his children (which he does). 
He cannot be guilty of these crimes and at the same time be plau­
sibly deemed a blessing for Athens. He cannot coherently claim to 
possess the virtues of character he does and at the same time be guilty 
of these crimes. Perhaps most significant, he caimot logically make 
sense of the fact that he is deemed guilty and at the same time had 
no knowledge of what he was doing and no choice because of the 
gods’ ordaining and causing his transgressive acts. Oedipus resolves 
this tension not by simply denying that he is guilty but by afiirming 
more profoundly his lack of agency: “Know that my actions consisted 
in suffering rather than in doing” (266-67). His proclaimed state of 
suffering allows him to accept the gravity and evil of the deeds; they 
have caused and continue to cause him painful suffering, and yet he 
removes the source of incoherence that would prevent the fulfillment 
of his psychic need for a coherent self and a maintainable consistency 
of all the truth axes. Oedipus does not explain further the distinction 
he relies on between suffering and doing. Does he mean to say that 
the gods have determined his actions and that he had no choice in 
the matter? Does he mean to say that he acted in ignorance of the fact 
that Jocasta was his mother and Laius his father and so he cannot be 
said to have chosen to do what he did? From the perspective we are 
taking, what matters about Oedipus’s rationale is that he himself feels 
a sense of certainty about it; he considers it true that he is exonerated. 
That the oracle foretelling his crimes turned out to be both unavoid­
ably fulfilled and something that he suffered unwillingly or in igno­
rance would not strike a Greek audience as strange.
INTERPERSONAL REALITY
Sophocles devotes considerable portions of Oedipus at Colonus to 
depicting how, in his final days, Oedipus distinguishes the threat­
ening “them” from the comforting “we,” and thus establishes an in­
terpersonal reality that fulfills his need for intersubjective truth and 
allows him to counteract some of his feelings of alienation and lack 
of belonging. His image of intersubjective truth consists in his cer­
tainty that he shares a sense of truth about facts, ideals, and so on 
with a particular group of people, and may not share that sense of truth 
with others outside of that group. By the end of the play, a distinction 
has been drawn clearly and defended: the people that Oedipus thinks 
share his interpersonal reahty and the elements of truth it includes 
are his daughters, the chorus, and Theseus. Those he has excluded by 
rejecting them for articulated reasons include Creon together with 
Oedipus s own sons, Eteocles and Polynices. In the course of the 
play, Oedipus has had to earn his alliance with the chorus and with 
Theseus, just as he has had to publicly reject his sons and Creon in 
order to definitively exclude himself from their judgment. Oedipus’s 
need for belonging is frustrated by his alleged guilt, the pollution he 
carries, his physical suffering, and his exile from Thebes. The success 
and rhetorical force with which he draws the line between those who 
share his reality and those who do not constitutes much of the thera­
peutic work accomplished in this play.
Oedipus’s close connection to the supremely loyal Antigone and 
their shared alienation announces itself firom the very start of the 
play as he declares, “We have come as strangers” (12-13) and “This 
girl sees for me” (33-34), the latter suggesting a vital dependence. 
As soon as Ismene arrives, Oedipus is quick to mark her inclusion 
in their alliance: “And it is from these two, who are maidens, that so 
far as their nature allows I have sustenance and a safe place to live 
and help from my family” (445-47). Notably, Oedipus’s daughters
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are the only ones in the play who touch him physically (329, 1113, 
1620-21), a point that is emphasized by the scene I have already 
discussed, where Oedipus suddenly realizes that, given his polluted 
state, he cannot touch Theseus as he wishes to (1132-38). Both 
daughters treat their father with kindness and sympathy (19-21, 
508-9) and share both his suffering and the happiness of their mu­
tual familial love; “Sad supports of a sad man!” (1109);^^ “For what 
was never dear was dear, when I had him in my arms!” (1698-99).^® 
Oedipus’s daughters thus share his view that he is worthy of sym­
pathy as someone who has suffered greatly and is therefore worthy 
of being accepted by Theseus as a suppliant. The sisters share in their 
father’s suffering, and Antigone explicitly echoes her father’s denial 
of guilt by explaining to the chorus that he acted “unwittingly” (240) 
and was controlled by the gods: “For however hard you look, you 
will not discern a mortal who, when a god drives him, can escape!” 
(252-54). Furthermore, in a striking asymmetry, Antigone chastises 
Polynices for his anger (1420), while she does no such thing in the 
face of her father’s protracted expression of anger against Polynices 
(1348-96), even though she had held out hope that Oedipus would 
feel pity for his son (1280-83).
Oedipus’s indignant speeches to Creon and Polynices denounce 
these men and, in doing so, specify the ways in which Oedipus does 
not share an image of reality with either of them. Creon insinuates 
an interpersonal reality that he and Oedipus share based on their fa­
milial ties: “It is not one man only who sent me, but all the citizens 
who commanded me, because family ties caused me to mourn his 
sorrows most in all the city” (737-39); “Is not the reproach bitter 
that I have levelled, woe is me, at you and at myself and at all our
15. Translation mine.
16. See also 330-31: Oedipus; “Ah children, sisters!” Ismene: “Ah unhappy state!” Oedipus: “Do 
you mean hers and mine?” Ismene; “Yes, and my own, unhappy as I am!”
family?” (753-54). Here Creon invokes a view of reality wherein he 
and Oedipus owe each other loyalty and feel each other s emotions 
because they are relatives. Oedipus angrily rejects Creon’s claim that 
he shares Oedipus’s sorrow and suffering:
Why do you try once more to catch me in the trap that would 
most pain me if you caught me? In time past when I was suffering 
from my private griefs, and it was my desire to be sent out of the 
land, you refused to grant me the favor I desired, but when I had 
had enough of my passion, and it was my wish to live at home, 
then you pushed me out and drove me into exile, caring not at all 
at that time for the kinship you now talk of! (763-771)
While Oedipus takes Creon to be deceiving and manipulating him 
by proposing that they share the loyalties that typically exist along 
with bonds of kinship, he rejects Polynices by disowning him and 
thereby breaking the bonds of kinship: “Be off, spat upon by me who 
am no more your father.... I call upon the hateful paternal darkness 
of Tartarus to give you a new home” (1383, 1389-90). Polynices 
appeals to his father to show sympathy for his son, but Oedipus now 
denies that they are father and son.
The chorus and Iheseus come not only to accept Oedipus and 
show him kindness but also to consider him part of their collective 
reality. Soon after meeting Oedipus, the chorus communicates their 
wish that he share in the city’s collective likes and dislikes: “You 
are a stranger, poor man, in a strange land; bring yourself to loathe 
what the city is accustomed to dislike and to respect what it holds 
dear” (184-87). Oedipus quickly agrees to do so. With the news of 
who Oedipus is, the chorus at first fears him (233-36), but he and 
Antigone win them over (237-91). Antigone succeeds in arousing 
their pity (254-55); Oedipus skillfully combines strategies in order 
to gain the chorus’s sympathy: he asks them to distinguish between
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his name and his nature; he redefines his transgressive actions as 
“suffering” rather than “doing”; he appeals to his “sacred” nature as a 
suppliant and their corresponding duties; and he promises to bring 
benefit to the citizens of Athens (258-91). He thereby earns their 
respect, and eventually their sympathy, which he repays by carrying 
out their instructions for performing religious rites according to their 
custom and thereby entering into their form of life (461-92). Having 
heard that Oedipus has a request to make of him, Iheseus greets him 
with empathy: “I have not forgotten that I myself was brought up in 
exile, as you were, and that in exile I struggled against such dangers to 
my life as no other man has met with; so that I would never turn aside 
from helping to rescue any exile such as you, since I know that I am 
a man, and that I have no greater share in tomorrow than you have” 
(562-68). Oedipus persuades Iheseus to grant his request for pro­
tection and a final resting place at Colonus by placing his promise of 
divinely ordained future benefit for Athens in the context of the ex­
istential meditation at 607-23 that we will examine later and which 
suggests that one day Athens’s relationship with 'Thebes will deteri­
orate and Athens will stand in need of the divine protection and ad­
vantage that Oedipus offers. By the time Creon threatens Oedipus 
and his daughters, Oedipus views himself as firmly ensconced in 
collective loyalty: “But who could catch me against the will of these 
allies?” (815).
SUBJECTIVE-EXISTENTIAL REALITY
As Yadlin-Gadot defines it, the subjective-existential truth axis fulfills 
the psychic need for an authentic image of the self—a sense of who 
one truly is to oneself (who I really am to me) and provides the experi­
ence of familiarity and intimacy with oneself: “The need for authentic 
existence is ensured by means of the subject’s link to what he perceives
TRUTH AND SELF AT COLONUS
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as his true self.”'^ This self is prone to particular vulnerabilities—the 
experience of shame and the fear of annihilation—and thus aims to 
counteract those vulnerabilities. Although Oedipus never speaks di­
rectly of an “authentic” self or who he “truly is ” he fully articulates 
the sense of existential angst and the fear of annihilation that Yadlin- 
Gadot identifies as the particular vulnerabilities this truth axis 
counteracts:
Dearest son of Aegeus, for the gods alone there is no old age 
and no death ever, but all other things are submerged by all- 
powerful time! The strength of the country perishes, so does 
the strength of the body, loyalty dies and disloyalty comes into 
being, and the same spirit never remains between friends or be­
tween cities, since for some people now and for others in the fu­
ture happy relations turn bitter, and again friendship is restored. 
And if now all is sunny weather between Thebes and you, time 
as it passes brings forth countless nights and days in which they 
shall shatter with the spear the present harmonious pledges for a 
petty reason. Then shall my dead body, sleeping and buried, cold 
as it is, drink their warm blood, if Zeus is still Zeus and his son 
Phoebus speaks the truth. (607-23)
Here Oedipus attempts to persuade Theseus that he cannot take any­
thing for granted about Athens’s future, and he accomplishes this 
through a protracted poetic musing on the threat of meaninglessness, 
the inevitabihty of death, and the transience of the goods in life. Later 
in the play, Oedipus also frankly acknowledges and accepts the shame 
of the incest (Jtautes oneidos/ 984). Because Oedipus thus explicitly 
confronts the essential pressures that figure into the formation of 
a “subjective-existential” or “authentic” self, it is reasonable to ask
17. Yadlin-Gadot (2016,125).
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whether the play offers any clues about, if not an “authentic” self, then 
at least the particular beliefs about himself he holds and articulates in 
order to counteract his fear of annihilation and the shame he carries 
with him. Oedipus’s confidence that his influence will continue after 
his death through his special, divinely appointed allotment as the ob­
ject of a hero cult grants him an unusually powerful antidote to mor­
tality. We might assume that he deals with his sense of shame with his 
belief that he has suffered the incest and the patricide rather than acted 
as an agent. And perhaps that is right. But there is another candidate 
for Oedipus’s “authentic” self that presents itself in a somewhat sur­
prising and prominent manner. I have already discussed the ways in 
which Oedipus’s role as a father to his daughters—and his rejecting 
the role of father to his sons—figures prominently in his image of fac­
tual reality and his presentation of himself in the play. We can say, in 
fact, that Oedipus is preoccupied almost from beginning to end with 
his own fatherhood and in particular with the exemplary behavior 
of his daughters and the love he feels toward them. The behavior of 
his sons has, to his mind, withdrawn him from any paternal relation 
to them. Two further points suggest that for Oedipus, loving father­
hood provides the image of reality that he chooses to count as his 
“personal truth” that is not necessarily acknowledged by others. (In 
fact, most are likely to view Oedipus’s fatherhood as deeply problem­
atic.) According to Yadlin-Gadot’s theory, the subjective-existential 
self finds its temporal mode in the present. Fatherhood for Oedipus 
characterizes a state in the present (while his role as a “blessing” for 
Athens will take place in the future), and furthermore a state that has 
(in the case of his daughters) withstood the radical upheavals that 
have devastated his life and sense of self Perhaps the most telling por­
trayal of Oedipus’s subjective-existential truth axis comes just before 
his death, when he embraces his daughters for the last time. In this 
moment Oedipus starkly faces the fear of annihilation that he had ar­
ticulated so clearly to Theseus earlier. Oedipus must choose his final
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words to his daughters, the one thing he will leave them with, the 
most important thing to say. He does not say “I have become a savior 
and a blessing for Athens” or “I am not guilty, I have suffered” or “I 
once more curse your brothers,” all of which would be in keeping 
with the play s discourse. Rather, he zeroes in on what he wants to be 
summed up in the face of death:
My children, on this day your father is no more! For everything 
is at an end for me, and no longer shall you have the irksome 
task of caring for me. It was hard, I know, my daughters; but a 
single word dissolves all these hardships. For from none did you 
have love more than from this man, without whom you will now 
spend the remainder of your lives. (1611-19)
Here Oedipus not only provides soothing words to his daughters; he 
also leaves them with a particular image of himself as a loving father. 
Of course, his chosen notion of his own fatherhood must overcome 
the reality of the incest and its threat to characterize him as a father 
who is also a brother. In his own eyes, Oedipus overcomes that threat 
by acknowledging rather than denying the shame of the incest (984), 
and at the same time maintaining that he did not knowingly commit 
incest and is therefore in that regard not an actor, but a sufferer 
(266-67). By contrast, he actively chooses his paternal relation to his 
daughters. The question of whether we find this reasoning compel­
ling is not relevant to the fact that Oedipus has estabhshed for himself 
a sense of truth about the matter. His self-characterization at this par­
ticular moment at the end of the play—as at every moment—must 
be seen as a choice. In this case it is one that exemplifies generosity 
and other-directedness rather than self-absorption or defensiveness. 
As we shall see, the virtue Oedipus displays here also plays an impor­
tant part in his ideal reality, the truth axis that resonates with values 
he aspires to.
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PRAGMATIC REALITY
From the moment he arrives at Colonus through the end of the play, 
Oedipus’s speech and actions are suflfused with a sense of purpose 
shaped by his goal of persuading Theseus to let him remain and die 
there so that he can fulfill the oracle’s prediction. Oedipus’s sense of 
pragmatic reality, his sense of working toward a future goal, therefore 
resonates emphatically throughout the play, and the achievement of 
that goal serves as the play’s culmination, although the alleged benefit 
that Oedipus will bring to Athens will reveal itself only in the future. 
Oedipus projects certainty of purpose and, of course, his belief that 
the gods have sanctioned and ordained this purpose: “I shall never 
again leave this seat.... It is the token of my destiny” (45-46)j “For he 
[Apollo] told me, when he predicted all that evil, that this should be 
my respite after long years, when I came to the land that was my final 
bourne, where I should find a seat of the dread goddess and a shelter, 
I should there reach the goal of my long-suffering life, bringing ad­
vantage by my settlement to those who have received me, and ruin to 
those who had sent me, who had driven me away” (88-91)j “Lead me 
then, daughter, so that we may tread where piety dictates, speaking and 
listening to others, and may not be at war with necessity” (188-91); 
“But they [Polynices and Eteocles] shall get nothing from me as an 
ally, neither shall they ever have benefit from this Cadmean kingship; 
that I know, from hearing this girl’s prophesies, and from interpreting 
the ancient oracles which Phoebus has at last fulfilled” (450-54).
IDEAL REALITY
Whatever ideals Oedipus may have striven for in the past as the 
ruler of Thebes have had to be either abandoned or pursued in a 
different context. At Colonus, Oedipus expresses his own ideals in 
his interactions with Creon and Theseus, as well as in his portrayal
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of his own piety and connection with the divine. By rebuking Creon 
for his dishonesty, manipulation, lack of shame, and lack of respect 
for justice (761-808), Oedipus identifies himself as someone who 
aspires to the opposing values of honesty, scrupulous speech, discre­
tion, and justice. Furthermore, in his confrontations with both Creon 
and Polynices, Oedipus claims to see through their duplicity, and in 
doing so displays, and lays claim to, a particular kind of discerning 
wisdom. Creon’s vices find their nearly exact counterpart in the 
virtues Oedipus attributes to Theseus and his people: “I have found 
in you [all] alone among mankind piety and fairness and the absence 
of lying speech!” (1126-27); “May you be blessed, Theseus, foryour 
nobility and for the righteous [endikou] concern that you have shown 
for us!” (1042-43). Oedipus explicitly claims that his own behavior 
embodies the justice entailed by keeping one’s promises (1489-90, 
1508-9), piety and reverence for the gods (“for I come sacred and 
reverent” [287]), actions that benefit others (576-78), and the ideal 
of familial love that we have already seen him articulate powerfully in 
his final words to his daughters.
THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS
In the case studies Yadlin-Gadot discusses, a neurotic patient char­
acteristically suffers from focusing too exclusively on one truth axis 
and neglecting the others. For example, a patient might be so intent 
on Uving according to certain ideals of love or achievement that he or 
she fails to incorporate any robust or certain sense of factual or co­
herent truth. In this case, therapy requires introducing the patient to 
the practice of exploring the other truth axes and their relationships
18. See Yadlin-Gadot (2016,191-238).
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to each other. What is the therapeutic process that Oedipus goes 
through in this play that results in his having articulated and sorted 
out the six aspects of his self? I have already mentioned that at the 
end of Oedipus the King Oedipus’s view of himself has shrunk into 
a single dominating vision of the man most hated by the gods. Of 
the intervening years before Oedipus at Colonus, what we know is 
that much time has passed, and perhaps that has given Oedipus the 
opportunity to reconstruct his view of himself. But in the course of 
Oedipus at Colonus there is a process that occurs and is dramatized. 
The outward manifestations of this process have been justly described 
by many scholars as a gradual gaining of confidence and power, as a 
process of Oedipus’s becoming heroic throughout the course of the 
play.*^ Bernard Knox charts the crucial shifts from the beginning to 
the end of the play: Oedipus begins the play in a self-effacing state 
of humility (llO, 144-48)j he has the grounds for a new confidence, 
having received that oracle from Apollo; the chorus notices that he 
“seems noble but unfortunate” (76). Ismene comes with news of an­
other oracle, and now Oedipus understands that it supplements the 
oracle he has received and that it is his burial place that will bring 
about his future influence. The ritual ceremony he directs to propi­
tiate the local goddesses (the Eumenides) restores and ensures his re­
lationship with them. When he comes face to face with the accepting 
Theseus, who behaves with ideal dignity and generosity, Oedipus’s 
confidence grows even more, so that, when he speaks to Theseus 
about the future defeat of Thebes, he assumes a formidable sense 
of authority. He condemns Creon justly and with vindictive wrath. 
According to Knox, Oedipus the hero is now reborn: he repudiates 
his sons with a “daimonic, superhiunan wrath,”^“ and with an almost
19. See, for example, Bowra (1944, 309)j Knox (1964, 143-62); Birge (1984, 11); Kowalzig 
(2006,82).
20. Knox (1964,159).
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numinous sound in his speech. Theseus recognizes him as a true 
prophet, and Oedipus has now become the hero that he will continue 
to be beyond his death.^* Others agree that in Oedipus at Colonus we 
witness “the actual process of the passing of Oedipus from a human to 
a heroic state.”“ This general description of the changes we witness in 
Oedipus throughout the course of the play seems right to me, as far as 
it goes, but these accounts focus on the changes in Oedipus’s behavior. 
I would like to suggest that there is more to say about what happens 
to. Oedipus internally as part of the process of becoming heroic. In 
articulating the six truth axes, as I have shown he does, Oedipus sorts 
out, separates, and defines the six separate dimensions of his self. This 
narrative he tells about himself is not occasioned by a specific expe­
rience; nothing in particular happens in response to which Oedipus 
says, “I hereby change my view about myself.” The events in the play 
that would seem to encourage his confidence and sense of power— 
for example, Apollo’s oracle and Theseus’s acceptance—may very 
well be important in encouraging him to formulate the views of him­
self that he does. However, what I would like to emphasize is that 
Oedipus presents articulate and elaborate rationales for everything 
he claims about himself—his view that he is a sufferer and not an 
agent, his rejection of Creon and of his sons, his belief that he is suc­
cessfully pursuing particular ideals. He is in this way absolved and 
defined by his own rational self-insight, by the distinctions he grasps, 
and by his ability to rewrite plausibly his view of who he truly is. In 
the end, with all six truth axes defined and separated, it would appear 
that he stands in a state of psychic balance and health with a full and 
nonconflicting disclosure of the different dimensions of his self One 
might think that Oedipus’s remaining anger toward his sons poses a
21. See Knox (1964,145-62).
22. Bowra (1944,309).
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conflict, or at least a question about psychic balance. But Oedipus’s 
anger is both an appropriate and, we might say, healthy component of 
a Greek hero’s character. More important, his anger is not a symptom 
of a conflict that has been left unaddressed. If it were, it would count 
as an indication of neurosis. But Oedipus suffers from no such neu­
rosis. He attains, in fact, a model of psychic health by addressing all of 
the truth axes and allowing them to coexist. Oedipus does not sani­
tize his view of himself or tie everything up neatly. His ability to main­
tain a complex image of himself and accept the tension introduced 
by his pollution and misfortune attest all the more to his therapeutic 
success. He does not deny the facts of his wretched past, but accepts 
them and counterbalances them with nodes of certainty that fulfill 
his various psychic needs. He does not need to reconcile his image 
of himself as a polluted monster and a savior because he can accept 
that he is both. The play does not explain why the gods have chosen 
to grant Oedipus special divine status and power. It does not need to 
because Oedipus simply accepts the fact that the gods have ordained 
it and he persuades Theseus of this fact.
The pragmatic axis governs the whole of the play insofar as 
Oedipus gradually fulfills the oracle’s prediction that he will come to 
a place where he is destined to die in some mysterious way and, after 
death, become a blessing to Athens and a curse to her enemies. 'The 
dramatic action of the play from beginning to end unfolds a growing 
sense that Oedipus will accomplish these goals through scenes where, 
at the same time he persuades Theseus and the Athenians to accept 
him and definitively aligns himself with Athens (by rejecting Creon’s 
and Polynices’s demands that he return to 'Ihebes), he also overcomes 
obstacles to psychic health by articulating the various truth axes, and 
thereby builds up a stronger, more balanced, and clearly defined con­
ception of himself. The strength of the self he articulates is rooted 
in the fact that all of his basic psychic needs are met. The action of 
the play could thus be said to, among other things, map out a series
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of psychological challenges successfully mastered: the threats of en­
during guilt, shame, alienation, purposelessness, fear of annihilation, 
and lack of aspiration. The play in this way portrays Oedipus’s in­
creasingly heroic nature as not only a matter of realizing his divine 
purpose and gaining confidence and power but also, and perhaps 
more systematically, reformulating through a process involving both 
reason and imagination the image he had of himself that had been so 
thoroughly damaged by the traumatic events of his past. The passages 
that I have referred to and quoted as evidence of Oedipus’s engage­
ment in defining the six truth axes permeate every scene of the play.
CONCLUSION
Oedipus at Colonus ends with a mysterious and powerful event that 
the entire play anticipates. But that event, Oedipus’s death, points to­
ward an unknovm future that has more to do with Athens and the eti­
ology of a hero cult than with Oedipus’s life.“ The play, I have argued, 
is concerned every bit as much with the reconstruction and defini­
tion of Oedipus’s self through the acknowledgment and definition 
of his different truth axes as points of certainty. The play shows us 
how a man who has suffered the most devastating traumas achieves 
the healthy integration of his different “selves” whereby all basic psy­
chic needs are met. Oedipus is not cured by his own suffering or by 
his becoming a “sufferer,” but rather by his own intellectual insight 
applied to his various images of reality and truth. His past traumatic 
experiences, although tragically inflated, can stand for any develop­
mental challenge that requires a reorganization of the psyche.
23. On the hero cult of Oedipus see Edmunds (1981); Kearns (1989, S0-S2); Lardinois 
(1992,322-27). On Greek hero cults generally see Burkert (1985,203) and Currie (2005, 
47-59).
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It should be clear by now that formulating the problem of this 
play by asking whether or not Oedipus is transformed into a savior 
does not do justice to the complexity of what transpires at Colonus. 
Oedipus is indeed a savior—in addition to many other things. The 
sorting out of his sense of truth constitutes the primary action of this 
play and allows him to transcend the need to simplify his polyvalent 
self. A far cry from a play full of diversions and thin plot structures, 
Oedipus at Colonus systematically unravels a masterful playing out of 
successful self-definition and psychic health in the face of the most 
challenging circumstances.^
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